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Abstract
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct
polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling.
We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in
which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We
also suppose that an agent’s vote is influenced by the votes
of their friends who have already voted. Despite its sim-
plicity, this model provides useful insights into a number
of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and
manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates
and the network structure affect the computational com-
plexity of computing which candidate necessarily or pos-
sibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks
with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candi-
dates, we provide polynomial algorithms for both prob-
lems. In other cases, we prove that computing which can-
didates necessarily or possibly win are computationally
intractable.
1 Introduction
A fundamental issue with voting is that agents may vote
strategically. Results like those of Gibbard-Satterthwaite
demonstrate that, under modest assumptions, strategic
voting is likely to be possible [19, 30]. However, such
results do not tell us how to vote strategically. A large
body of work in computational social choice considers
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how we compute such strategic votes [14, 13]. Typically
such work starts from some strong assumptions. For ex-
ample, it is typically assumed that the manipulators have
complete information about the other votes. The argu-
ment given for this assumption is that computing a strate-
gic vote will only be computationally harder with incom-
plete information. In practice, of course, we often only
have partial or probabilistic information [32, 8]. It is also
typically assumed that manipulators will vote in any way
that achieves their ends. However, in practice, agents may
be concerned about peer pressure and may not want to
deviate too far from either their true vote or that of their
peers [26]. Bikhhardani et al. [4] identified several factors
that limit strategic voting by an individual agent such as
sanctions on deviation, and conformity of preferences. A
third strong assumption is either that all voting happens
simultaneously or that the manipulators get to vote after
all the other agents. Again, in practice, this is often not
the case.
These issues all come to a head in social polling. This is
a context in which voting meets social networks. Startups
like Quipol and GoPollGo use social networks to track
public opinions. Such polls are often not anonymous. We
can see how our friends have voted and this may influ-
ence how we vote. By their very nature, such polls also
happen over time. The order in which agents vote can
therefore be important. The structure of social networks
is also important. For example, a distinctive feature of
social networks is the small world property which allows
members of these communities to share information in a
highly efficient and low cost manner. A rumor started in
the Twitter network reaches about 90% of the network in
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just 8 rounds of communication [11]. In a similar way,
one member of a social network can quickly create and
publicize a poll among a large group of agents starting
from his friends. The massive size of social networks, like
Facebook, Twitter and Google+, gives statistically signif-
icant polls.
To study social polling, we set up a general model that
captures several important features of voting within a so-
cial network. First, our model uses the structure of the
social network. How an agent votes depends on how their
friends vote. Second, our model supposes agents vote se-
quentially and the order in which they vote is not under
their control. For example, when you vote may depend
on when one of your friends chooses to invite you to vote.
Third, our model supposes that agents are influenced by
their friends. In fact, an agent’s vote is some function of
their true preferences and of the preferences revealed by
the votes of their friends that have already voted. We can
obtain different instances of our model by choosing dif-
ferent functions.
To study this model, we consider a particular instance
that captures some of the features of a Doodle poll. More
precisely, each agent has a set of k preferred candidates
and is indifferent about other candidates. Among these k
preferred candidates, one candidate is her top choice. If a
particular candidate among her k preferred candidates has
a majority amongst her friends that have already voted,
then she mimics their choice. Otherwise, she votes for her
top choice. Note that any computational lower bounds de-
rived for this particular instance also hold for the general
model.
Even though this instance of the model is simple and
lacks some of the subtleties of social influence in prac-
tice, it nevertheless provides some valuable insights. For
example, we prove that it is computationally hard to de-
termine if a given candidate has necessarily won a social
poll, irrespective of how the remaining agents vote. We
also show that this intractability holds even if the social
graph has a simple structure like a disjoint union of paths.
Of course, in practice social influence is much more com-
plex and subtle. In addition, social graphs often have
much a richer structure than simple paths. Finally, agents
in general do not know precisely how all the other agents
will vote. However, all these issues will only increase
the computational complexity of reasoning about a social
poll.
We focus here on computing the possible and necessary
winners of the social poll. A candidate is a possible win-
ner if there exists a voting order such that this candidate is
a plurality winner over the cast votes. Similarly, a candi-
date is a necessary winner if he is a plurality winner over
the cast votes for each voting order. The possible and nec-
essary winner problems are interesting in their own right.
In addition, they provide insight into several related and
interesting problems. For example, they are related to the
control problem in which the chair chooses an order of
participation for the agents that favors a particular out-
come. In particular, the chair can control the result of the
election in this way if and only if their desired candidate
is a possible winner.
2 Problem Statement
We consider a scenario where each agent votes for ex-
actly one candidate. We are given a social network graph
G = (V,E) whose n vertices are the agents x1, . . . , xn, a
set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of m candidates, a distinguished
candidate c∗ ∈ C, and a choice function h, which for
every agent xi, every subset S ⊆ NG(xi) of its neigh-
bors in G, and every vote of an agent in S, assigns the
candidate that xi votes for. Each agent casts exactly one
vote according to the following model. For a given vot-
ing order pi = (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)), let Si denote the set
{xj : pi−1(j) < pi−1(i)} ∩ NG(xi), i.e., the neighbors
of xi that vote before xi. Each agent xi votes for the
candidate that the choice function h assigns for the given
candidate xi, the subset Si and the votes of the agents in
Si. The score of a candidate c is the number of agents
that vote c in the voting order pi. A candidate c ∈ C is
a (co-)winner in the voting order pi if no other candidate
has higher score than c. A candidate is a possible winner
if there exists a voting order where c is a winner. A can-
didate is a necessary winner if for every voting order, c is
a winner.
Refined model. We introduce a particular instance of the
choice function h. This is defined via two preference func-
tions p1 : V → C and P : V → 2C . Each agent x ∈ V has
a set P (x) ⊆ C of k preferred candidates, where k > 1
is a constant. Among the preferred candidates, one can-
didate p1(x) ∈ P (x) is the top preferred candidate. Let
x be an agent and S be the subset of NG(x) that voted
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before x. If there exists a candidate c ∈ P (x) such that
more than half of the agents from S voted for c, then x
votes for c. Otherwise, x votes for p1(x). Note that all
complexity lower bounds for this refined model also hold
in the general model.
The unweighted possible winner (UPW ) problem is to
determine for an instance as described above whether c∗
is a possible winner. Similarly, the unweighted necessary
winner (UNW ) problem is to determine whether c∗ is a
necessary winner. The weighted possible/necessary win-
ner (WPW/WNW ) problems are defined similarly, ex-
cept that integer weights are associated with agents and
the score of a candidate is the sum of the weights of the
agents that voted him.
3 Overview of Results
We will show that the computational complexity of the
possible and necessary winner problem depends on the
structure of the underlying social graph and the number
of candidates. In particular, we prove that if the underly-
ing social graph has bounded treewidth and the number of
candidates is bounded then the unweighted possible and
necessary winner problems can be solved in polynomial
time (Corollary 1). The degree of the polynomial bound-
ing the running time of this algorithm is a function of the
number of candidates and the treewidth of the social net-
work graph. We give evidence that this cannot be avoided
by showing that the problem is not finite-state. For ar-
bitrary social network graphs and a bounded number of
candidates, the weighted possible winner problem is NP-
complete (Theorem 4), while the weighted necessary win-
ner problem is polynomial (Corollary 2). If we relax the
restriction on the treewidth, all problems become com-
putationally intractable (Theorems 5– 6). Finally, we in-
vestigate these problems under the assumptions that the
number of candidates is unbounded and the social graph
is a disjoint union of paths. We show that the unweighted
possible winner problem is hard even if the length of each
path is at most one (Theorem 7). By contrast, the nec-
essary winner problem is polynomial (Corollary 2) un-
der the assumption that the number of candidates is un-
bounded and the underlying social graph has bounded
treewidth. Our results also demonstrate that the possi-
ble winner problem is inherently computationally harder
than the necessary winner problem. This is not surprising
as the necessary winner problem requires much stronger
conditions to be satisfied for a candidate to be a necessary
winner. Table 1 summarizes our results.
4 Related work
The possible and necessary winner problems were intro-
duced in the context of simultaneous voting to capture un-
certainty in preferences. For example, due to incomplete
preference elicitation, we may have only have partial or-
ders over the candidates as the preferences of the voters.
Konczak and Lang considered two questions over a profile
with partial orders [22]. Let c∗ be a distinguished candi-
date. The first question is whether there is an extension of
the partial orders to linear orders such that the candidate
c∗ wins. The second question is whether the candidate
c∗ wins for every extension of the partial orders to linear
orders. Our definitions of possible and necessary winner
problems are inspired by these two questions, but with
uncertainty introduced by the voting order.
Xia and Conitzer [33] identified connections between
possible and necessary winner problems and a number
of important problems in computational social choice,
including manipulation and preference elicitation prob-
lems. The computational complexity of the possible and
necessary winner problems under many commonly used
voting rules has been extensively investigated [33, 32].
If the number of candidates is bounded and votes are
unweighted then these problems can be solved in poly-
nomial time for any voting rule that itself is polyno-
mial [32, 7, 27]. If the number of candidates is unbounded
and votes are weighted, these problems become computa-
tionally hard [32, 7]. Xia and Conitzer also investigated
the setting where the number of candidates is unbounded
and votes are unweighted [33]. They showed that the
computational complexity in this case depends on the vot-
ing rule. Their results also demonstrate that the possible
winner problem is computationally harder than the nec-
essary winner problem for many rules, including a class
of positional scoring rules, Maximin and Bucklin voting
rules. We observe a similar relation between the com-
putational complexity of possible and necessary winner
problems in social polls.
Perhaps closest to this work is Alon et al. [1]. However,
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# cands graph class UPW UNW WPW WNW
O(1) bounded treewidth P (Cor 1) P (Cor 1) NPC (Thm 4) P (Cor 2)
(paths of length ≤ 2)
O(1) bipartite NPC (Thm 5) co-NPC (Thm 6) NPC (Thm 5) co-NPC ( Thm 6)
O(n) bounded treewidth NPC (Thm 7) P (Cor 2) NPC (Thm 7) P (Cor 2)
(paths of length 1) (paths of length 1)
Table 1: Overview of results
the problems studied there are rather different. In their
model, agents have private preferences and vote strategi-
cally. An agent experiences disutility if the winning can-
didate differs from his vote. The authors derive an equi-
librium voting strategy as a function of previously cast
votes. As soon as a candidate accumulates a (small) lead,
all future votes are cast in his favor independent of private
preferences. This “herding” behavior is compared across
simultaneous and sequential voting equilibria. Simulta-
neous and sequential voting mechanisms have also been
compared based on how well preferences are aggregated
in equilibria of corresponding games [9, 2]. Preference
aggregation over multiple issues in the presence of influ-
ence has also been studied by Maudet et al. [24].
5 Preliminaries
Graph theory. We refer to [10] for basic notions of
graphs and digraphs. The path on k vertices is denoted
Pk. For our algorithmic results, a central notion is the
treewidth of graphs [28]. A tree decomposition of a graph
G = (V,E) is a pair ({Bi : i ∈ I}, T ) where the sets
Bi ⊆ V , i ∈ I , are called bags and T is a tree with ele-
ments of I as nodes such that:
1. for each edge uv ∈ E, there is an i ∈ I such that
{u, v} ⊆ Bi, and
2. for each vertex v ∈ V , T [{i ∈ I : v ∈ Bi}] is a tree
with at least one node.
The width of a tree decomposition is maxi∈I |Bi|−1. The
treewidth of G is the minimum width taken over all tree
decompositions of G.
Social network graph. Let V be a set of voters. A binary
friendship relation FR on V is a collection of unordered
pairs F ⊆ V × V . We consider a relation FR that is
symmetric, reflexive and complete. Given FR we build
the social network graph G as follows. For each agent
vi ∈ V we introduce a vertex vi. We connect two vertices
vi and vj iff (vi, vj) ∈ FR.
NP-complete problems. Our hardness reductions rely
on the NP-completeness of several classic problems [18].
A PARTITION instance contains a set of integers A =
{k0, . . . , kn−1} such that
∑n−1
j=0 kj = 2K. The problem
is to determine whether there exists a partition of these
numbers into two sets which sum to K. A 3-HITTING
SET instance contains two sets: Q = {q0, . . . , qn−1} and
S = {S1, . . . , St}, where t ≥ 2 and for all j ≤ t, |Sj | = 3
and Sj ⊆ Q. The problem is to determine whether there
exists a setH , a so-called hitting set, of size at most k such
that H ∩ Si 6= ∅, i = 1, . . . , t. Consider a set of Boolean
variablesX = {x1, . . . , xn}. A literal is either a Boolean
variable xi or its negation x¯i. A clause is a disjunction of
literals. A Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form
(CNF) is a conjunction of m clauses, {c1, . . . , cm}. A
(3≤, 3≤)-SAT instance is a CNF formula such that every
clause has at most 3 literals and each variable occurs at
most 3 times. The problem is to check whether there ex-
ists an instantiation of Boolean variables X to make the
(3≤, 3≤)-SAT instance evaluate to TRUE, which is an NP-
complete problem [31].
6 Tractable cases
In this section we describe algorithms for the polynomial
time solvable cases in Table 1. To simplify the descrip-
tion, we use the concept of nice tree decompositions. A
tree decomposition ({Bi : i ∈ I}, T ) is nice if each node
i of T is of one of four types:
Leaf node: i is a leaf in T and |Bi| = 1;
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Insert node: i has one child j, |Bi| = |Bj |+1, andBj ⊂
Bi;
Forget node: i has one child j, |Bi| = |Bj | − 1, and
Bi ⊂ Bj ;
Join node: i has two children j and k and Bi = Bj =
Bk.
An algorithm by Kloks [21] converts any tree decompo-
sition into a nice tree decomposition of the same width in
linear time.
A score function of C is a function # : C → N. A score
function # can be achieved by an instance if there is a
voting order where c is voted by #(c) agents, for every
candidate c ∈ C.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm, which,
given a social network graph G = (V,E) with treewidth
t = O(1), a set C of m = O(1) candidates, and pref-
erence functions P and p1, computes all possible score
functions that can be achieved by this instance.
Proof. By Bodlaender’s algorithm [5], compute a mini-
mum width tree decomposition of G in linear time. Let t
denote the width of this tree decomposition. Using Kloks’
algorithm [21], convert it into a nice tree decomposition
of width t with O(n) nodes in linear time. Select an ar-
bitrary leaf of this tree decomposition, add a neighboring
empty bag r and root the tree decomposition at r. Denote
the resulting tree decomposition by ({Bi : i ∈ I}, T ).
In the description of our algorithm, we denote by G↓i
the subgraph induced by the subset of all vertices occur-
ring in Bi and bags associated to descendants of i in T .
First, observe that the vote of a given agent does not de-
pend on the ordering of the agents that voted before her,
but solely on which subset of her friends were ordered be-
fore her. Therefore, instead of storing partial orderings of
agents that have already been processed, we may merely
store acyclic orientations of subgraphs of the friendship
graph, where an edge oriented from x to y represents that
x votes before y. Any linear ordering extending a given
acyclic orientation of the friendship graph will produce
the same voting outcome.
Our dynamic programming algorithm will process
bottom-up from the leafs to the root of the tree decom-
position. The computation at an internal node i looks up
the already computed results stored at its children. Note
that we cannot afford to remember all oriented paths in
all relevant orientations of G↓i that were computed at de-
scendants of node i. All we need to remember at node i
is whether for two vertices x, y ∈ Bi, our computations
rely on orientations of subgraphs of G↓i that contain a di-
rected path from x to y. If so, we remember that there is
a path from x to y by adding an arc (x, y) to a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) with vertex set Bi to the local infor-
mation stored at this node. Additionally, for every edge
xy in G[Bi], we also need to decide (resp., go over all
possible decisions), whether x votes before y, or y votes
before x. This is again stored by orienting the edge xy
accordingly. Therefore, at a node i, we process all DAGs
on the vertex set Bi whose underlying undirected graphs
are supergraphs of G[Bi]. For such a DAG D, we also
process all votes of the vertices in Bi (a voting function
v : Bi → C), all potential scores of candidates result-
ing from the votes of vertices in G↓i (a score function
# : C → {0, . . . , n}). In addition, in order to do a sanity
check to determine whether an agent x ∈ Bi has indeed
cast her vote according to our model after we have seen
the votes of all her friends, we store for each candidate in
P (x) \ p1(x) how many friends voted that candidate (an
influence function s mapping an agent x ∈ Bi and a can-
didate c ∈ P (x)\p1(x) to a natural number in {0, . . . , n})
and how many of her friends voted before her (an anterior
function a : Bi → {0, . . . , n}).
A voting function v : X → C on a subset of agents
X ⊆ V is legal if v(x) ∈ P (x), for every agent x ∈ X . A
voting function v : X → C extends a voting function v′ :
X ′ → C if X ′ ⊆ X and v(x) = v′(x) for every x ∈ X ′.
An anterior function a : X → {0, . . . , n} is compatible
with an influence function s : X × C → {0, . . . , n} if for
every x ∈ X , we have that∑c∈P (x)\p1(x) s(x, c) ≤ a(x).
A voting function v is compatible with two compatible an-
terior and influence functions a : X → {0, . . . , n} and
s : X × C → {0, . . . , n} if for every vertex x ∈ X
with NG(x) ⊆ X , we have that v(x) = c if there ex-
ists a c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x) such that s(x, c) > a(x)/2, and
v(x) = p1(x) otherwise. A voting function v : X → C is
compatible with a score function # : C → {0, . . . , n} if
for every candidate c ∈ C, |{x ∈ X : v(x) = c}| = #(c).
The function s is compatible with a DAG D with vertex
set X and a voting function v if for every agent x ∈ X
and every candidate c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x), we have that
s(x, c) = |{y ∈ N−D (x) : v(y) = c}|. The func-
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tion a is compatible with D if for every agent x ∈ X ,
a(x) = |N−D (x)|. We say that v, D, #, s, a are mutually
compatible if a is compatible with s, v is compatible with
a and s, v is compatible with #, s is compatible with D
and v, and a is compatible with D.
The algorithm computes a table entry for every relevant
set of parameters (i, v,D,#, s, a), which is a Boolean
and is TRUE if and only if there is an acyclic orientation
D↓i of G↓i such that:
• if there are two vertices x, y inBi and a directed path
from x to y in D↓i, then the arc (x, y) is in D,
• the voting function v : Bi → C can be extended to a
legal voting function v′ : V (G↓i)→ C, and
• v′, D↓i, #, s, a are mutually compatible.
Now that we have identified the relevant information
stored at each node of the tree decomposition, the ac-
tual dynamic programming recurrences are fairly straight-
forward. We only need to ensure that the computations
rely on already-computed table entries that are compati-
ble with the entry that is being computed. For simplicity,
we disregard issues arising from out-of-bounds table pa-
rameters and undefined values by assuming those entries
to be FALSE.
Leaf. Suppose i is a leaf with Bi = {x}. We set
T (i, v,D,#, s, a) to TRUE if D = ({x}, ∅), v : {x} → C
is legal, and v, D, #, s, a are mutually compatible, and to
FALSE otherwise.
Insert node. Suppose i is an insert node in T with
child j. Let x be the unique agent in Bi \ Bj . We set
T (i, v,D,#, s, a) to FALSE if v is not legal or s(x, c) is
not the number of y ∈ N−D (x) such that v(y) = c, for
every c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x), or a(x) 6= |N−D (x)|. Otherwise,
set T (i, v,D,#, s, a) := T (j, v′, D′,#′, s′, a′) where:
• v′ = vBj ,
• D′ = D − x,
• #′ is obtained from # by decrementing #(v(x)) by
one,
• s′ is obtained from sBj×C by decrementing
s(y, v(x)) by one for every y ∈ N+D (x) such that
v(x) ∈ P (y) \ p1(y), and
• a′ is obtained from aBj by decrementing a(y) by
one for every y ∈ N+D (x).
Here, fA denotes the restriction of a function f : B → C
to a subdomain A ⊆ B.
Forget node. Suppose i is a forget node in T with child
j. Let x be the unique agent in Bj \ Bi. Since x occurs
only in Bj and its descendants in T , all neighbors of x
are in V (G↓i). Therefore, we now do a sanity check and
disregard all situations where x does not vote according
to our model. We set T (i, v,D,#, s, a) to FALSE if v is
not legal, or v(x) = p1(x) but there exists a candidate c ∈
P (x) \ p1(x) with s(x, c) > a(x)/2, or v(x) 6= p1(x) but
s(x, c) ≤ a(x)/2 for every candidate c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x).
Otherwise it is obtained by computing a disjunction of all
T (j, v′, D′,#′, s′, a′) such that:
• v′ extends v,
• D = D′ − x,
• # = #′,
• s = s′,
• a = a′,
• if v′(x) = p1(x) then s(x, c) ≤ a(x)/2 for every
c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x), and
• if v′(x) 6= p1(x) then s(x, v′(x)) > a(x)/2.
Join node. Suppose i is a join node in T with children j
and j′. Since all agents that occur in both G↓j and G↓j′ ,
also occur in Bi, we can easily correct any overcounting
resulting from summing values for the subproblems at j
and j′ when computing the functions #, s, and a at node
i. We set T (i, v,D,#, s, a) to be a disjunction over all
T (j, v′, D′,#′, s′, a′) ∧ T (j′, v′′, D′′,#′′, s′′, a′′) with:
• v = v′ = v′′,
• D = D′ = D′′,
• #(c) = #′(c) + #′′(c)− |{x ∈ Bi : v(x) = c}| for
each c ∈ C,
• s(x, c) = s′(x, c)+s′′(x, c)−|{y ∈ N−D (x) : v(y) =
c}| for each x ∈ Bi and c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x), and
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• a(x) = a′(x) + a′′(x)− |N−D (x)| for each x ∈ Bi.
After all table entries have been computed, we inspect
the entries at the root node r of T . Since Br is empty, all
table entries associated with node r have an empty voting
function v, a vertex-less DAG D, and empty anterior and
influence functions a and s. The only relevant informa-
tion still contained in these entries are the score functions
# that can be achieved by the instance. The algorithm
returns these score functions.
Let us now upper bound the number of table entries.
The number of nodes of T is O(n). For each node i of
T , |Bi| ≤ t. Thus, the number of legal voting functions
v : Bi → C is at most kt. Denoting by qt the number
of labeled directed acyclic graphs on t nodes, qt can be
expressed by the recurrence relation
qt =
t∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(
t
k
)
2k(t−k)qt−k
with q1 = 1 [20, 29]. Asymptotically, qt =
O(t!2(
t
2)1.488−t) (see, e.g., [23]). The number of dis-
tinct score functions is bounded by n|C|. The number of
influence functions is bounded by nt(k−1). The number of
anterior functions is bounded by nt. Finally, the number
of table entries is O(n · kt · t!2(t2) · n|C| · nt(k−1) · nt).
Each table entry can be computed in time O(n|C|+tk).
Indeed, the computations at the leaf and the insert nodes
can be done in time O(1). A table entry computed at a
forget node i ranges over all legal extensions v′ of v and
all digraphsD′ such thatD = D′−x. Since |V (D′)| ≤ t,
there are O(3t) such digraphs: each vertex from D is ei-
ther not a neighbor or an in-neighbor or an out-neighbor
of x in D′. The number of legal extensions of v to the
domain Bi ∪ {x} is k. Thus, table entries at a forget node
can be computed in time O(3t) which is in O(n|C|+tk) if
n > 1. Computations at join nodes range over all pos-
sibilities to sum #′(c) and #′′(c) to #(c) + |{x ∈ Bi :
v(x) = c}| for each c ∈ C, all possibilities to sum s′(x, c)
and s′′(x, c) to s(x, c) + |{y ∈ N−D (x) : v(y) = c}| for
each x ∈ Bi and each c ∈ P (x) \ p1(x), and all possibil-
ities to sum a′(x) and a′′(x) to a(x) + |N−D (x)| for each
x ∈ Bi. Thus, the computation of a table entry at a join
node looks up O(n|C|+tk) table values. All in all, our al-
gorithm has running time O(n1+2|C|+2tk · kt · t! · 2(t2)) =
O(n1+2|C|+2tk · 2t log k+t log t+t2).
After executing this algorithm, one can easily identify
whether a candidate c is a possible or necessary winner
by inspecting the score functions that can be achieved by
the instance.
Corollary 1. For any class of instances where the
treewidth of the social network and the number of can-
didates are bounded by a fixed constant, the unweighted
possible and necessary winner problems can be solved in
polynomial time.
Theorem 4 shows that the weighted version of the pos-
sible winner problem is NP-hard under the same restric-
tions. The necessary winner problem can be reformulated
asm−1 subproblems of the following type: is there a vot-
ing order where candidate d achieves a higher score than
candidate c? If some other candidate can achieve a higher
score than our distinguished candidate c∗, then c∗ is not
a necessary winner. Testing whether a candidate d can
achieve a higher score than a candidate c can be done by
a slight variation of our previous algorithm, even for the
weighted version of the problem and for an unbounded
number of candidates.
Corollary 2. The weighted necessary winner problem
can be solved in polynomial time for social network
graphs with treewidth O(1).
Proof. We need a polynomial time test of whether a can-
didate d achieves a higher score than a candidate c. We
modify the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 1 as fol-
lows. Remove the function # from the table parame-
ters. Instead, each table entry is an integer, representing
the maximum possible value of the score of candidate d
minus the score of candidate c in this subinstance. This
change implies some other changes in the computation of
the table entries (a disjunction of table entries becomes a
maximum, setting a table entry to FALSE becomes setting
its value to−∞, etc.), all of which are straightforward. In
the end, there is a voting order where d achieves a higher
score than c if the unique table entry at the root of the tree
decomposition is positive. Since all factors of the form
n|C| in the running time bound of Theorem 1 are due to
the table parameter #, this variant is polynomial even for
an unbounded number of candidates.
Although the algorithm from Theorem 1 is polynomial
whenever |C| and t are upper bounded by a fixed con-
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stant, its running time seems prohibitive even for rela-
tively small values of |C| and t. This is largely due to
the degree of the polynomial bounding the running time
depending on |C| and t. Therefore, a natural question is
whether the problems can be solved in time f(|C|, t) · nc,
where c is a constant independent of |C| and t, and f is
a function independent of n. Formulated in the terms of
multivariate complexity [12, 15, 17, 25]: are the problems
fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) parameterized by |C|+ t?
We conjecture that they are W [1]-hard, and give support-
ing evidence in terms of finite-state properties of graphs
[3, 6, 16].
Definition 1. An l-boundaried graph is a triple (V,E,B)
with (V,E) a simple graph, and B ⊆ V an ordered sub-
set of l ≥ 0 vertices. Vertices in B are called boundary
vertices.
Definition 2. The operation ⊕ maps two l-boundaried
graphs G and H , l ≥ 0, to a graph G⊕H , by taking the
disjoint union of G and H , then identifying correspond-
ing boundary vertices, i.e., for i = 1..l, identifying the ith
boundary vertex of G with the ith boundary vertex of H ,
and removing multiple edges.
If F is an arbitrary family of (ordinary) graphs, we de-
fine the following canonical equivalence relation ∼F,l in-
duced by F on the set of l-boundaried graphs.
Definition 3. G1 ∼F,l G2 if and only if for all l-
boundaried graphs H , G1 ⊕H ∈ F ⇔ G2 ⊕H ∈ F .
The graph family F is of finite index if∼F,l has a finite
number of equivalence classes for all l ≥ 0.
Slightly abusing notation, we use the previously de-
fined terms for instances of our problems instead of
graphs.
Theorem 2. The class of unweighted instances where the
social network graph has treewidth at most 1, the number
of candidates is at most 2, and c∗ is a possible (respec-
tively, necessary) winner is not of finite index.
Proof. Let F be this class of instances. We consider the
equivalence relation ∼F,0 and show that it has an infinite
number of equivalence classes. For every positive integer
i, define the 0-boundaried instance Li whose social net-
work graph is the path Pi and every voter x on this path
has P (x) = {c∗, a} and p1(x) = c∗. For every positive
integer i, define the 0-boundaried instance Ri whose so-
cial network graph is the path Pi and every voter x on this
path has P (x) = {c∗, a} and p1(x) = a. If i > j, then
Li 6∼F,0 Lj since c∗ is a winner in Li ⊕ Ri for every or-
dering of the voters, but c∗ is not a winner in Lj ⊕Ri for
any ordering of the voters. Thus, every Li, i ≥ 0, is in a
different equivalence class of the relation ∼F,0.
Consequently, finite-state automata are not amend-
able to give an FPT algorithm, even for the parame-
ter treewidth when the number of candidates is upper
bounded by a constant. Intuitively, Theorem 2 implies
that the amount of information that the usual kind of al-
gorithms need to transmit when transitioning from one
bag of the tree decomposition to the next cannot be up-
per bounded by a function depending only on the width of
the tree decomposition. It could still be upper bounded by
an FPT function though, in which case the other standard
algorithmic technique for bounded-treewidth instances,
dynamic-programming, could still give an FPT algorithm.
However, the following theorem shows that the index can-
not be upper bounded by an FPT function either.
Theorem 3. For every integer n, the class of unweighted
instances whose social network graph has n vertices and
treewidth at most 1, the number of candidates is k, and c∗
is a possible (respectively, necessary) winner has index at
least bn/kck−1.
Proof. Let Fn be this class of instances. We consider the
equivalence relation ∼Fn,0 and show that it has at least
bn/kck−1 equivalence classes. Let ` := bn/kc. For pos-
itive integers i1, . . . , ik−1 ≤ `, define the 0-boundaried
instance Li1,...,ik−1 whose social network graph is a dis-
joint union of paths Pij , j = 1, . . . , k − 1, and ev-
ery voter x on the path Pij has P (x) = {c∗, aj} and
p1(x) = aj . For positive integers i1, . . . , ik ≤ `, de-
fine the 0-boundaried instance Ri1,...,ik whose social net-
work graph is a disjoint union of paths Pij , j = 1, . . . , k,
and every voter x on the path Pij with ij < k has
P (x) = {c∗, aj} and p1(x) = aj and every voter x on
the path Pk has P (x) = {c∗, a1} and p1(x) = c∗. Now,
if (i1, . . . , ik−1) 6= (i′1, . . . , i′k−1), then Li1,...,ik−1 6∼Fn,0
Li′1,...,i′k−1 . To see this, suppose, w.l.o.g., that i1 < i
′
1.
Then c∗ is a winner in Li1,...,ik−1 ⊕ R`−i1,...,`−ik−1,` for
every ordering of the voters, but c∗ is not a winner in
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Figure 1: The construction from Theorem 4
Li′1,...,i′k−1⊕R`−i1,...,`−ik−1,` for any ordering of the vot-
ers. Thus, every Li1,...,ik−1 , 0 ≤ ij ≤ `, is in a different
equivalence class of the relation ∼Fn,0.
Thus, we have little hope that the running time of the
algorithm from Theorem 1 can be improved significantly.
7 Intractable cases
We observe that an isolated agent that has no friends al-
ways votes for her top preferred candidate. To simplify
notations, we call the score of a candidate that comes from
all isolated agents the basic score. Our intractability re-
sults hold even if each voter has two preferred candidates.
We denote the two preferred candidates of a voter (x, y),
where x is the top preferred candidate.
Theorem 4. The weighted possible winner problem is
NP-complete even if the social network graph is a dis-
joint union of paths of length at most two, the number of
candidates is constant, and each agent has two preferred
candidates.
Proof. We reduce from an instance of the PARTITION
problem to WPW with three candidates {a, b, c}.
For each integer kj , j = 0, . . . , n − 1 we intro-
duce 3 agents 3j, 3j + 1 and 3j + 2, with prefer-
ences (c, b), (a, c), (b, c), respectively. The weights of the
(3j)th agent and the (3j+ 1)th agent are one. The weight
of the (3j+ 2)th agent is kjB, where B is a large integer,
for instance 2n + 1. Agents 3j, 3j + 1 and 3j + 2 form
the jth path of friends, ((3j, 3j + 1), (3j + 1, 3j + 2)),
that corresponds to the kj th element. We introduce an ad-
ditional agent without friends, with preferences (a, c) and
weight KB + 2n. We ask whether a is a possible winner.
Figure 1 illustrates the construction.
The basic score of a is KB + 2n. The idea of the con-
struction is to make sure that the preferred candidate a
wins iff the weighted votes of (3j + 2)th agents, j =
0, . . . , n−1, are partitioned equally between candidates b
and c. Consider the jth path ((3j, 3j+1), (3j+1, 3j+2)).
The (3j + 2)th agent either votes for b or for c depend-
ing on the relative order of the candidates in this path.
As the weight of the (3j + 2)th agent is kjB, either c
or b increases its score by kjB. Let J be a set of paths
such that the (3j + 2)th agent selects b, j ∈ J , and
Jc = {0, . . . , n − 1} \ J contains all paths such that the
(3j + 2)th agent selects c, j ∈ Jc. Then the total weight
that the candidate b gets is
∑
j∈J kjB = B
∑
j∈J kj .
If
∑
j∈J kj > K then the score of b is strictly greater
than the maximum score of a. Similarly, the total weight
that the candidate c gets is
∑
j∈Jc kjB = B
∑
j∈Jc kj .
If
∑
j∈Jc kj > K then the score of c is strictly greater
than the final score of a. Therefore, the only way for a
to win is if there exists a partition
∑
j∈J kj = K and∑
j∈Jc kj = K. In this case, score(c) ≤ KB + 2n,
score(b) ≤ KB+ 2n and score(a) ≥ KB+ 2n. Hence,
a is a co-winner iff the PARTITION instance is a YES-
instance.
Suppose a partition (J, Jc) ofA exists with
∑
j∈J kj =∑
j∈Jc kj . For the jth path, j ∈ J we fix an order 3j ≺
3j+1 ≺ 3j+2, where x ≺ y means x votes before y. For
the jth path, j /∈ J we fix an order 3j+ 1 ≺ 3j ≺ 3j+ 2.
This ensures that the weights of the (3j + 2)th agents in
all paths are split equally between b and c. Hence, a is a
co-winner.
Theorem 5. The unweighted possible winner problem is
NP-complete even if the number of candidates is constant,
the social network graph is bipartite, and each agent has
two preferred candidates.
Proof. We reduce from an instance of the 3-HITTING SET
problem. For each element qj , j = 0, . . . , n− 1 we intro-
duce 4 agents 4j, 4j + 1, 4j + 2 and 4j + 3, with prefer-
ences (c, b), (a, c), (b, c) and (b, c), respectively. Agents
4j, 4j + 1, 4j + 2 and 4j + 3 form a path of friends.
We say that agents 4j, 4j + 1, 4j + 2 and 4j + 3 rep-
resent the jth path that corresponds to the qj th element.
In particular, we refer to the (4j + 1)th agent as an
element-agent, as her decision corresponds to a selec-
tion of the qj th element into a hitting set. For each set
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Figure 2: The construction from Theorem 5
Si = (qh, qs, qr), i = 1, . . . , t we introduce D agents
{(4n − 1) + D(i − 1) + p}, p = 1, . . . , D, with prefer-
ences (b, a). The ((4n− 1) +D(i− 1) + 1)th agent is a
friend of the (4h+ 1)th, (4s+ 1)th and (4r+ 1)th agents.
Moreover, (4n − 1) + D(i − 1) + p, p = 1, . . . , D form
a path of friends that starts at (4n − 1) + D(i − 1) + 1
and ends at (4n − 1) + D(i − 1) + D. We refer to these
as set-agents. Finally, we introduce B − k −Dt isolated
agents with preferences (a, c) and B − 2k isolated agents
with preferences (b, c), where B and D > t are large in-
tegers such as n9 and n4. We ask whether a is a possible
winner. Figure 2 illustrates the construction. The basic
score of a is B − k − Dt and of b is B − 2k. The idea
of the construction is that for a to win it needs at least
Dt − k votes. The construction ensures that at most k of
the (4j+ 1)th element-agents, j = 0, . . . , n− 1, can vote
for a, otherwise b beats a. This corresponds to a selection
of k elements in the hitting set. The Dt set-agents must
all vote for a, otherwise a loses, which is possible iff a set
of element-agents that selected a corresponds to a hitting
set.
Select a set of elements. If the (4j+1)th element-agent in
the jth path selects the candidate a then the agents (4j+2)
and (4j + 3) will select their choice b. Hence, increasing
the score of a by 1 increases the score of b by 2 if we
only consider voters in the jth path. The basic score of
a is B − k − tD, the maximum number of points that a
can gain from set-agents is Dt, and the basic score of b is
B − 2k; hence at most k element-agents can select a.
Check a hitting set. Suppose exactly k′ element-agents
selected a and the corresponding k′ elements cover t′ sets.
The remaining set of element-agents vote for c. Hence,
Dt′ set-agents vote for a and the remaining (t− t′)D vote
for b. Then the maximum score of a isB−(k+Dt)+(k′+
t′D). The maximum score of b in this case is B − 2k +
2k′+(t−t′)D. For a to beat bwe needB−(k+Dt)+(k′+
Dt′) ≥ B−2k+2k′+(t−t′)D or 2Dt′+k ≥ k′+2Dt.
As D > t, this inequality holds iff t′ ≥ t. Hence, k′
selected elements must form a hitting set. As at most k
element-agents are allowed to select a, the problem has a
solution iff there is a solution to the hitting set problem.
Order construction. Let H be a hitting set of size k.
Then J = {h : qh ∈ H} and Jc = {0, . . . , n − 1} \ J .
First, the agents {4j, . . . , 4j + 3}, j ∈ J vote in the order
4j+1 ≺ 4j ≺ 4j+2 ≺ 4j+3, so that each agent selects
his top choice. Then all set-agents vote in the order (4n−
1)+1 ≺ (4n−1)+2 ≺ . . . ≺ (4n−1)+D(t−1)+D. As
the set J corresponds to the hitting set H , all set-agents
vote for a. Finally, the agents {4j, . . . , 4j + 3}, j ∈ Jc,
vote in the order 4j ≺ 4j + 1 ≺ 4j + 2 ≺ 4j + 3, so that
each of these agents selects c.
Theorem 6. The unweighted necessary winner is co-NP-
complete even if the number of candidates is constant, the
social network graph is bipartite, and each agent has two
preferred candidates.
Proof. We use the construction from Theorem 5. We ask
if the candidate b is a necessary winner. This means b does
not lose to any other candidate under any order. Note that
c cannot win the poll under any order as the maximum
possible score of c is 4n. Hence, b is a necessary winner
iff there is no order such that a gets more points than b.
From Theorem 5 if follows that a gets more points than b
iff there exists a solution to the 3-HITTING SET problem.
Theorem 7. The unweighted possible winner problem is
NP-complete even if the social network graph is a disjoint
union of paths of length at most 1 and each agent has two
preferred candidates.
Proof. We reduce from an instance of the (3≤, 3≤)-SAT
problem. We assume that the formula does not contain
unit clauses and pure literals as those can be removed
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Figure 3: The construction from Theorem 7
during a preprocessing step. Therefore, each variable oc-
curs either twice positively and once negatively or once
positively and twice negatively. Hence, each variable
can satisfy at most 2 clauses. For each literal, xi (x¯i),
i = 1, . . . , n, we introduce a candidate labeled with xi
(x¯i). For each clause, cj , j = 1, . . . ,m, we introduce a
candidate labeled with cj . Finally, we introduce a dummy
candidate d and the distinguished candidate a. For each
variable xi, i = 1, . . . , n, we introduce two var-agents,
{2i, 2i+1}, with preferences (xi, x¯i) and (x¯i, xi), respec-
tively. Agents 2i and 2i+1 are friends. For each clause cj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m, of length 3, cj = (lt, ls, lr), j = 1, . . . ,m,
lh ∈ {xh, x¯h}, h ∈ {t, s, r}, we introduce 6 clause-
agents, {2n + 6j + 1, . . . , 2n + 6j + 6}, that we split
into three groups of two agents, one group for each literal
in a clause. Agents in each group are friends. The first
group contains two agents with preferences (cj , d) and
(lt, cj), the second – two agents with preferences (cj , d)
and (ls, cj) and the third – two agents with preferences
(cj , d) and (lr, cj). For each clause cj , j = 1, . . . ,m of
length 2, cj = (lt, ls), j = 1, . . . ,m, lh ∈ {xh, x¯h},
h ∈ {t, s}, we introduce 6 clause-agents: two groups of
two agents for each literal in the clause as described above
and two isolated dummy agents with preferences (cj , d).
Finally, we introduce 3 isolated agents with preferences
(lh, d), for each literal lh ∈ {xh, x¯h}, h = 1, . . . , n and 5
isolated agents with preferences (a, d). We ask whether a
is a possible winner. Figure 3 illustrates the construction.
The basic score of a is 5, of a literal lh, lh ∈ {xh, x¯h},
h = 1, . . . , n, is 3 and of a clause cj of size 2, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, is 2.
Select an assignment. Consider a variable xi and the two
corresponding var-agents, 2i and 2i + 1. These agents
make sure that either xi or x¯i gets two points exclusively.
As the basic score of xi and x¯i is 3, if xi (x¯i) gets 2
points from var-agents then it is not allowed to get any
points from clause-agents. We say that the candidate xi
is selected by an assignment iff x¯i gets two points from
var-agents and x¯i is selected otherwise. We emphasize
that candidates that are not selected by an assignment are
not allowed to obtain any additional points from clause-
agents.
Check an assignment. Consider a clause cj =
(xt, x¯s, xr). Due to clause-agents, the candidate cj gets
at least three points from the corresponding clause-agents
regardless of the voting order. Moreover, the candidate cj
can get at most five points from these clause-agents, oth-
erwise a loses. Hence, at least one point has to be given
to one of the candidates {xt, x¯s, xr}. Hence, at least one
of these candidates must be selected to the assignment. In
other words, the corresponding literal satisfies the clause
cj . The analysis for clauses with two literals is similar.
Note that a candidate in an assignment can gain at most
two points from clause-agents. In other words, it can sat-
isfy at most two clauses, which is the maximum number
of clauses that a variable can satisfy in the (3≤, 3≤)-SAT
problem that we consider in the reduction. Hence, a wins
iff there exists a solution of the (3≤, 3≤)-SAT problem.
Order construction. Let L be the literals in a satisfying
assignment. For i = 1, . . . , n, if xi ∈ L then the agent
2i+1 votes at position i and, otherwise, the agent 2i votes
at position i. This fixes the voting order of n first agents.
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Then all clause-agents cast their votes. Note that as L is
a satisfying assignment, none of the candidates cj , j =
1, . . . ,m has more than 5 points. The voting order of the
remaining agents is arbitrary.
8 Conclusions
We have introduced a general model of social polls in
which an agent’s vote is influenced by their friends in their
social graph that have already voted. We consider a par-
ticular instance of this model in which influence is very
simple: an agent votes for their most preferred candidate
unless one of their k most preferred candidates has al-
ready received a majority of votes from their friends who
have already voted. We consider how to compute who can
possibly or necessarily win such a social poll depending
on the order of the agents yet to vote. These problems are
closely related to a number of questions regarding control
and manipulation of such votes. Our results show that the
computational complexity of the possible and necessary
winner problems depend on the structure of the underly-
ing social graph and the number of candidates. The pos-
sible winner problem is NP-hard to compute in general,
even under strong restrictions on the structure of the social
graph. By comparison, the necessary winner problem is
often computationally easier to compute. For instance, it
is polynomial to compute if the social graph has bounded
treewidth.
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